1. Common Start – Different Paths
At the dawn of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the three Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the two Transcaucasian republics (Armenia and Georgia) were the only ones determined and consistent in pursuing their democratic aspirations. Interestingly, at this point in history, a “strategic” coordination was established between these two blocs of Soviet republics with regard to the policies of the central authorities.
It was not a coincidence that even before Yerevan held an official referendum on declaring independence on September 21, 1991, Lithuania already in August of the same year was the first country in the world to recognize Armenia’s independence. It is symbolic that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only in the newly independent Baltic states, Armenia and Georgia, former dissidents and leaders of independence movements became state leaders, unlike the other Soviet republics, where power remained in the hands of the former party bosses, which ineptly tried to adapt to democratic governance and the liberal economic model.
However, after gaining independence, the Baltic and Caucasus states followed strategically different paths of state-building and involvement in the international community. There were both objective and subjective reasons for that.
2. Baltic Choice
In the case of the Baltic region, the decisive and unifying role was played by the common cultural and civilizational factor (despite significant differences), the relatively recent joint historical experience of forced incorporation into the USSR, and the ability to subjugate separate national interests to common regional priorities. A huge role was played, on the one hand, by the West’s unambiguous support for the Baltic states, and on the other hand, a rather restrained reaction from Moscow, especially during the Yeltsin era, to the secession of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, due credit must be given to the foresight and determination of the political elites of the Baltic states, who have drawn the necessary lessons from their recent tragic experience and, since the very first years of independence, have set themselves the strategic goal of eliminating in the future any possibility of loss of statehood. Having consolidated all their resources and playing ahead of the curve, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became an integral part of the EU and NATO as early as 2004.
3. Caucasian Way
From the mid-1990s to the present day, both various political figures and the expert community continue to look at the path taken by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as a model for the states of the Caucasus region. Unfortunately, the South Caucasus, unlike the Baltic states, implies commonality only in terms of geographical affiliation. In all other respects, there are significant differences and contradictions that hindered in the past and continue today to create significant obstacles to the formation of a single geopolitical and geostrategic space. Along with cultural and civilizational differences (Armenians and Georgians are Orthodox Christians, Azerbaijanis are Shiite Muslims), it is necessary to take into account that the history of the countries of the South Caucasus is still a source of disunity and rivalry, which in the case of Armenians and Azerbaijanis causes irreconcilable enmity. The inter-ethnic conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian) not only excluded any possibility of the unification of Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku to develop and promote a common regional agenda, but also predetermined disunity and the imperative of the “zero sum game” model, especially clearly manifested in the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation. As a result, the problem of existential security became the cornerstone that determined the geopolitical course of each individual country of the South Caucasus. Thus, over time, especially after the “Rose Revolution” in 2004, Tbilisi moved towards strategic rapprochement with the West. Azerbaijan from the very first days of independence consistently promoted the idea of “one nation-two states” with Turkey, while Armenia, constrained by its geopolitical choice due to the tragic past of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and hostile relations with Azerbaijan, had no choice but to enter Moscow’s sphere of influence. It is true that since the late 1990s Yerevan, through its proclaimed policy of complementarity, based on mitigating the contradictions of powers pursuing their own interests in the region, reducing possible risks, and ensuring national security of the country, has tried to balance its dependence on Russia with timid attempts to develop relations with the West; nevertheless, neither Brussels and Washington, nor even more so Moscow, were under any illusions about Armenia’s genuine aspirations and real opportunities to turn towards Europe.
4. Recent History – In Search of Peace(?)
In previous articles (“War and Ethnic Conflict: From the South Caucasus to Europe and the Middle East” *, LIIA, November 16, 2023, “Armenia 2023 – in search of a new security configuration” **, LIIA, October 02, 2023) it was noted that the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and subsequent trends in the development of the situation have radically changed not only the regional balance but also the balance of power of extra-regional players, each pursuing mutually exclusive goals. Against this background, everyone almost on a daily basis talk about peace and prospects for regional prosperity. To what extent do such optimistic forecasts and wishful thinking correspond to the real state of affairs? Is the Baltic experience applicable to the South Caucasus?
As is well known, every war eventually ends in peace. Despite President Aliyev’s assurances that Baku has achieved its goals and extended a hand of peace to Yerevan, his actions increasingly strengthen the well-founded suspicion that the notion of peace for Azerbaijan differs significantly from its perception not only by Armenia, but also by many representatives of the international community. In this regard, the fundamental ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, who argued that throughout history wars have been fought not simply to win a war, but primarily to impose their will on the enemy and establish a peace that best serves the interests of the victorious side, are extremely instructive.
Azerbaijan won the war in 2020, imposed its will on the official Yerevan, as a result of which, on September 19-20, 2023, it solved the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh by force and the flight of all Armenians who have lived on this territory for thousands of years. Has Azerbaijan thus achieved a better peace and will it restrain itself with those achievements? It seems that the regime in Baku has drawn respective conclusions from the history of previous wars, as well as from the sad experience of peacemaking.
Thus, one of the rules of international relations states that no post-war political order can be stable if the defeated country considers it unacceptably unjust. This was the case after the Peace of Versailles between the victorious countries and defeated Germany. Despite Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s assurances that Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan, Baku and many stakeholders are well aware that a huge injustice has been done to the Armenians, and with statements alone, the problem is far from closed. It is characteristic that Aliyev periodically recalls the “Armenian revanchists”, threatening them with inevitable retribution.
Consequently, it is already obvious that Baku will not be content with just Karabakh. Its strategy is, at a minimum, that in the future, with changes in the geopolitical situation unfavorable for Azerbaijan, Armenia will turn out to be incapable and deprived of any opportunity to recover and pose a potential threat. Thus, the true goal of Azerbaijan’s “peace agenda” is to force Yerevan to fully and unconditionally accept the terms of capitulation, which, in fact, would put the very immunity and viability of Armenia’s state under a big question mark. Most recently, on November 4 2023, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister disavowed his country’s position, stating that “negotiations (with Armenia) will continue when Yerevan accepts Baku’s conditions”. Having closed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, is now playing along with Russia, with which, without Yerevan’s participation, is trying to neutralize and/or finally solve the entire problem of Armenia. Yerevan, in its turn, having finally lost faith in Russia as its “ally”, makes a geopolitical turn to the West.
Historical experience in peacemaking indicates that if a punitive peace settlement is dictated without negotiation with the defeated party, its authors will need a comprehensive plan that will deny that country the opportunity to redress its grievances through military revision. This seems to be the ultimate goal pursued by Baku and Ankara.
Back in 1992, then Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, who took part in the opening of the bridge in Nakhijevan (Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijan, separated from its metropolis by the Syunik (Zangezur) region of Armenia), declared the need to uproot “this damned wedge” dividing the entire Turkic world. Today, already in a new situation, Azerbaijan, Turkey and together with them Russia are doing everything possible to lay the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, which will connect Turkic peoples from the Mediterranean coast to the western borders of China, creating new geopolitical realities and strategic threats for a number of countries of the region. It is not by chance that in recent days both the US and the EU have warned Baku against encroaching on Armenia’s territorial integrity.
Another important part of Azerbaijan’s “peace” plan is the demand for the return of the so-called enclaves, namely 8 villages that will control Armenia’s geographical and infrastructural connection with Georgia and Iran. In this case, Armenia will be under a complete blockade by Baku and Ankara.
After the end of the war, Ilham Aliyev repeatedly claimed that the Soviet government had illegally “donated” a number of “historical Azerbaijani provinces” to the “artificial entity of the Socialist Republic of Armenia” and that after 1991 the “Armenian fascist regime” had expelled hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from their homes. At the same time, official Baku initiated the creation of “Western Zangezur” (referring to Armenia’s Syunik province) and created a list of approximately 130,000 Azerbaijanis who must return to “their ancestral lands”. In recent years, the rhetoric has become even more heated with statements that the entire territory of Armenia, including the capital Yerevan, is a historical Azerbaijani land. Former Azeri Foreign Minister Tofik Zulfugarov stated in a recent interview that Armenia would have to settle for 8,000 square kilometers.
In his triumphant, albeit contradictory statements, the Azerbaijani leader claims that “we are not going to fight another war with Armenia, but we will return to our lands not in tanks, but in cars”. Apparently, another condition for Baku to establish “peace” is Yerevan’s consent to the return of Azerbaijanis to various regions of Armenia. Taking into account demographic trends, in the perspective of one generation the number of Azerbaijanis may become a real threat to Armenia’s 3 million and constantly shrinking population.
As the victorious side, Azerbaijan voices the need to receive retributions and reparations from Armenia for inciting the war and “occupation” of Nagorno-Karabakh. After the 2020 war, there was unofficial talk of 50 billion dollars, but currently, they are already talking about a figure of 100 billion. In this regard, there is a risk that in case of refusal of payments, Baku may again go for military annexation.
The above is by no means a complete or even final list of Baku’s demands, which is constantly expanding and supplementing its conditions, confirming doubts that Azerbaijan is not interested in peace.
Among other things, any international or regional order requires a functioning “policeman” or “guarantor”. Today, a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus is in the process of being painfully created, but its final establishment will be determined by the outcome of the greater battle that will determine the “new” guarantor in the region. With so many unknowns, it is premature to talk about peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus, but it can be reconfirmed with full confidence that building a lasting peace is a more difficult task than waging a war.
