By IFIMES
International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies
Iran’s bombardment of Israel on 1 October 2024, with approximately 180 projectiles, including many ballistic missiles, marked a clear shift toward direct confrontation between the two regional powers, Iran and Israel. This contrasts with the indirect ‘proxy wars‘ waged since 7 October 2023, through pro-Iranian militias, particularly the Palestinian Hamas movement, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. According to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the attack came in response to Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in central Tehran on 31 July 2024, and Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024.
This attack differs from Iran’s earlier strike on 13-14 April this year, as it was twice as intense. In this operation, Iran used ballistic missiles, unlike the April attack, where mostly drones and cruise missiles were employed. Most of the missiles in the April strike were conventional rockets, which took at least two hours to reach their targets in Israel, except for a few ballistic missiles. In contrast, in the latest attack, the rockets took only 15 minutes to hit their targets in Israel. For the first time, Iran deployed its hypersonic missile “Fattah,” capable of speeds 15 times faster than the speed of sound and with a range of up to 1,400 kilometres. This is only the second time such missiles have been used, with Russia deploying them first in the Ukraine war.
The activation of the Lebanese front
There is a well-known saying attributed to Lenin that “there are decades where nothing happens, and weeks where decades happen.” This saying has never felt more true than during this fateful September, which began with the explosion of thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah, followed by the assassination of Iran’s key ally in the region, Hassan Nasrallah, in Beirut. These dramatic developments triggered a series of questions: What is Iran’s true role in the conflict? Will Iran avoid a direct confrontation with Israel? Is Iran’s support for its Middle Eastern allies enough to counter Israel’s superior military machine? Could Iran be willing to sacrifice its allies in exchange for a stronger position in its nuclear negotiations with the West? Many questions are being raised about the nature of the relationship between Tehran and pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Since the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel conflict on 7 October 2023, Hezbollah’s stance has been clear – to support the Hamas movement in the war by opening the northern front, thereby exerting military, economic, and psychological pressure on the Israeli army. However, the warfare on the northern front over the course of the year was governed by the “rules of engagement (ROE)”[2]. Both sides largely stuck to these rules, with Israeli planes bombing Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah responding with rocket attacks on Israeli military bases in northern Israel—blow for blow, according to the rules.
The assassination of Nasrallah disrupted the long-standing “deterrence” policy that has consistently shaped the complex dynamics between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. Iran spent decades building Hezbollah, not just as one of its key proxies, but also as a critical element of the Islamic Republic’s defence doctrine. It is estimated that Hezbollah holds around 150,000 missiles and several thousand drones, all acquired with Iran’s help over more than a decade. Hezbollah has served as Iran’s “insurance policy” against any Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities.
In response to this series of strikes, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated at the United Nations on 25 September 2024, that Hezbollah is “fully capable of defending itself and of defending Lebanon and the Lebanese people.”[3] Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, speaking at the UN General Assembly, condemned Israel’s war in Gaza and warned that its attacks on Lebanon could not simply go unanswered. He adopted a more conciliatory tone compared to his hardline predecessors, avoiding rhetoric about eliminating Israel as the Islamic Republic’s greatest enemy. The Iranian president added that Israel seeks to drag Iran into a war, adding that “Iran is ready to de-escalate tensions with Israel and lay down arms if Israel does the same.” This statement drew criticism from some rigid conservatives close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei concerning his remarks about easing tensions with Israel.[4]
Iran has found itself trapped in the web of regional alliances it has spun itself to secure external protection. Both Iran and Israel are ensnared in a downward spiral of violence, and it is currently impossible to predict to what extent and how far this conflict might spread. In any case, Iran is now in a defensive position, as its alliance system has been shaken by the defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah, thus diminishing its credibility as a regional power. As a result, Tehran felt compelled to retaliate with these missile strikes on Israel.
Escalation within the rules of engagement and mutual deterrence
According to analysts, the current escalation is unfolding within the bounds of the rules of engagement and mutual deterrence and is unlikely to escalate into a wider regional conflict. In all these strikes, Iran has refrained from targeting key strategic sites in Israel, such as airports, ports, power plants, or the Dimona nuclear reactor. There is no doubt that, prior to both attacks, there were indirect communications with Washington concerning their nature, scale, and timing. Tehran informed Moscow of the scope of its strikes, allowing the U.S. and Israeli sides to be notified through international intermediaries.
Israel’s potential response to the Iranian strike
In the aftermath of the attack, Israel promptly issued threats to respond by targeting Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities. Its air force had been preparing for this scenario as early as 2022. Israel views Iran as an existential threat because of its nuclear program and has repeatedly warned it would destroy the Bushehr nuclear plant. In late May 2022, Israel conducted exercises for this situation, deploying 100 fighter jets and submarines. However, Israel faces significant challenges in carrying out such a mission against Iran, as this would not resemble the operation to destroy Iraq’s Tammuz nuclear reactor in June 1981, where 16 F-16s were used. This time, such an operation is nearly impossible.
Among the preparations Israel began in 2019 was the acquisition of F-35 aircraft with larger fuel tanks, allowing them to carry out strikes on Iran without relying on refuelling tankers, thus completing the mission without requiring mid-air refuelling.
However, an F-35 fighter with larger fuel tanks will not be able to carry enough bombs to strike heavily fortified targets, and, in addition, it will lose some of its stealth technology to avoid detection by Iranian radars. Other aircraft, such as the F-16s and F-15s, will need to refuel, putting them in a very vulnerable position against Iranian radar systems.
The United States is not backing an Israeli strike on Iran, as the Pentagon does not have precise intelligence on the air defence systems Iran possesses—whether they are Russian-made S-400s or other systems manufactured domestically. It stands to reason that any nation capable of producing ballistic and hypersonic missiles, like Iran, can also develop advanced air defence technologies.
The Pentagon is keen to prevent its advanced F-35 jets from being shot down over Iranian soil, fearing a repeat of the 1999 incident when an F-117 Stealth fighter was brought down over Serbia, with its secrets falling into the hands of China and Russia. The Pentagon was forced to halt production of those aircraft and replace them with the more modern F-35 program. The Pentagon also has a bitter history with Iran, dating back to November 2019, when Iranian air forces shot down an RQ-4 Global Hawk drone using their domestically produced “Sevom Khordad” system, despite the drone’s cutting-edge technology.
Tehran, on the other hand, has conveyed a clear message to Israel through intermediaries,[5] warning that any military attack will be met with a harsh and unconventional response, involving the destruction of Israel’s critical civilian and military infrastructure. Given the speed and effectiveness of Iran’s ballistic and hypersonic missiles, one question remains – if Israel attacks Iran with F-35 fighter jets and succeeds, Iran will respond with an unconventional strike on military and civilian airports. Will Israeli fighter jets then find suitable runways in Israel to land on upon their return? Meanwhile, Israel’s threat to launch powerful military strikes against Iran remains merely a media ploy. It is possible that Israel will respond in a more limited way, using long-range missiles that could target non-strategic areas without causing fatalities. This was the case with Israel’s 19 April 2024 strike on the area around the Iranian military airbase near Isfahan.[6]
Resolving the Palestinian issue – the key to regional security and stability
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has aspired to become the dominant power in the region. To achieve these historical ambitions, it has embraced the Palestinian cause and the rhetoric of Israel’s destruction as a means to this national goal. Tehran has provided financial and military support to various resistance groups against Israel, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthi movement, and other Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, forming the “axis of resistance.” Israel must understand that it cannot destroy Iran, but bringing an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would remove Tehran’s main leverage and eliminate its ability to use the Palestinian issue as a political tool for regional dominance.
Since the founding of Israel, every U.S. administration has supported an Israeli-Palestinian peace based on a two-state solution. Over the past three decades, the United States has attempted to mediate an agreement between the two sides but has largely failed, mainly because neither side is willing to make the concessions demanded by the other. Although the U.S. has never given up and has consistently urged both sides to compromise, it has never wavered from the principle that a two-state solution remains the only practical option. Israel, in particular, must understand that no future U.S. administration is likely to change this stance.
Despite a growing belief among Israelis that the two-state solution is no longer viable, there is no other sustainable option to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many Israelis have been misled by the false narrative that a Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel, whereas, in reality, Israel’s national security lies precisely in the creation of a Palestinian state, with full cooperation between the two sides on issues ranging from the economy to national security.
Israelis and Palestinians have become increasingly intertwined, making territorial separation virtually impossible. There are about three million Palestinians in the West Bank, more than two million in Gaza, and two million in Israel. Meanwhile, there are more than 700,000 Israelis in the West Bank, including 230,000 in East Jerusalem. The total number of Israeli Jews is approximately equal to the total number of Palestinians across all three areas, each around seven million. Under no circumstances will either side be able to eradicate the other or attempt ethnic cleansing in any form, including through violence.
Whatever the outcome of the escalation or a future war between Iran and Israel, the root cause of the conflict will remain—the Palestinian issue. There is no doubt that peace and stability in the Middle East, which would ensure safety and security for the region’s countries and peoples, as well as for Israel and the Jewish people, begins with the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels, 8 October 2024
