The International Institute for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, conducts regular analyses of developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and globally. In response to the unfolding situation in Türkiye, IFIMES has prepared a comprehensive analysis. From the extensive report titled “Türkiye 2025: Türkiye’s political future following the arrest of İmamoğlu“, we highlight the most important and compelling excerpts.
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In late March 2025, Türkiye once again captured global headlines amid mass protests organised by the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), in major cities including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Observers are struggling to understand what is happening in the country, but this situation is not unique to Türkiye. The entire global political stage is marked by ambiguity. The world has been affected by a series of profound crises over the past fifteen years and is undergoing a period of radical transformation. The impact of this shift is visible across nations — the political course taken by former US President Donald Trump being just one example of such changes.
Following several days of heightened tension and political turmoil triggered by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, the protests began to lose momentum. This was particularly evident in Türkiye’s largest city, Istanbul, after formal charges of corruption and embezzlement were brought against him. While İmamoğlu and his close allies continued to frame the case as politically motivated, the investigators’ evidence—together with isolated incidents in which protesters attacked the police—led to a decline in enthusiasm among those who had initially been determined to support the opposition’s leading figure to the very end.
The arrest of Istanbul Mayor and CHP presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu on 19 March 2025, and his formal indictment on corruption charges, sparked political controversy both within the country and abroad. For some, it marked a serious blow to the country’s democratic process and a clear sign that President Erdoğan is seeking to monopolise power, sensing a moment of geopolitical stability, as the United States under Trump no longer appears concerned with whether its allies are governed by autocrats or democrats.
The arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu ignited the largest wave of protests against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2013, mobilising two million citizens and CHP supporters to take to the streets. Their aim was not only to condemn the arrest, but also to demand change and articulate hopes of ending the long-standing dominance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Most of the demonstrators were young people, disillusioned after 24 years of AKP rule. They also used the protests to express their frustration with the CHP leadership’s continued failure to provide credible opposition in recent years. Many CHP supporters felt let down by the refusal of other opposition parties to join the demonstrations.
The anti-corruption operation launched by the state was not directed exclusively at the Republican People’s Party (CHP), but included all political parties. The investigation covered 59 municipalities affiliated with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), 58 with the CHP, 21 with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 10 governed by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), and seven linked to the Good Party (İYİ). The launch of the operation from Istanbul was interpreted as an attempt by President Erdoğan to sideline İmamoğlu, who is seen as a potential rival in the elections. However, what was largely overlooked is that it was members of the CHP—most notably the team of former party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who were the first to submit the corruption files to the state.
İmamoğlu submitted a 121-page testimony to the investigators, while 25 witnesses were questioned—most of them affiliated with the CHP. Only four were protected witnesses, and nearly all were employees of the Istanbul city administration.
If the arrest of the Istanbul mayor on 19 March was based solely on judicial grounds, as the authorities claim, then the revocation of his university degree just hours earlier suggests an attempt to disqualify him from running in the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for 2028.
Erdoğan seized the opportunity
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seized the moment that aligned with his interests to eliminate his leading challenger for the presidency. He initiated his offensive at a time when the world is in need of a stable, strong, and effective Türkiye:
- Ceasefire negotiations are being held between Russia and Ukraine, with Türkiye acting as a key player, as Turkish peacekeeping forces are expected to be deployed along the lines of separation.
- The European Union is facing a moment of unprecedented weakness, largely due to threats by US President Donald Trump to reduce NATO funding and impose steep tariffs on EU goods. If the EU is seriously considering the creation of its own army, this would not be possible without Türkiye, which has the second-largest army in NATO after the United States, with a force of around one million.
- China is under mounting economic and political pressure from the United States, while Türkiye is regarded as a pivotal actor, exerting considerable influence in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
- Iran, both a friend and a regional rival of Türkiye, is facing military threats from the West, led by the United States and Israel. No sanctions against Iran can succeed without Türkiye’s cooperation.
- Türkiye’s influence in Syria is expanding, in coordination with Washington and possibly Moscow—though this may also lead to the risk of military confrontation with Israel, which strongly opposes Turkish involvement near its borders.
Domestic developments in Türkiye are unfolding at a time when the world’s major powers are focused on pressing global issues. Seizing this critical moment, Erdoğan moved to bring an end to the political career of his rival.
Despite the outbreak of demonstrations and the possibility that they may continue, Erdoğan is confident they will lose momentum, given that Türkiye’s growing strategic importance outweighs Western concerns about the country’s democratic direction. International reactions to the mass popular protests in Türkiye have been muted, reflecting Western pragmatism in dealing with the situation. Although Western leaders have publicly criticised the crackdown on civil liberties, strategic interests remain the dominant force shaping their relationship with Ankara.
Who is Ekrem İmamoğlu?
Initially little known beyond the ranks of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), İmamoğlu rose to prominence in 2014 when he was elected mayor of Beylikdüzü, a major district on the European side of Istanbul. He quickly emerged as a central figure in national politics after being nominated by the CHP to run for mayor of metropolitan Istanbul—one of the world’s largest cities, home to some 16 million people.
Although İmamoğlu’s political background was shaped by his family’s ties to the centre-right, his career would follow a different trajectory. His father had been a political activist in the centre-right Motherland Party, established in the 1980s as a civilian alternative to the ruling party then backed by the military establishment. İmamoğlu, however, embraced social democracy under the influence of his wife, Dilek Kaya İmamoğlu, whom he married in 1995.
Born on 4 June 1970 in the Black Sea province of Trabzon, İmamoğlu began studying Business Administration at Istanbul University. He continued his studies at a university in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus before returning to Istanbul, where he completed his degree. More than thirty years later, in a controversial decision, Istanbul University revoked his diploma—along with those of 28 others—citing so-called “general complaints” and alleged irregularities in graduation procedures.
İmamoğlu emerged as a leading figure in 2019, when the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was seeking a strong candidate for the local elections in Istanbul. Party-commissioned polls revealed that he enjoyed broad popularity—not only among CHP supporters, but also among Istanbul’s independent voters. Those close to him credit his rise to his remarkable ability to engage with people and his natural gift for persuasion. The CHP subsequently selected him as its candidate in the local elections held on 31 March that year. He went on to secure a narrow but decisive victory over his rival, Binali Yıldırım—a former prime minister and one of President Erdoğan’s closest associates.
However, the outcome was short-lived, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) challenged the results over alleged irregularities, leading the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) to annul the election and order a re-run. On 23 June 2019, more than ten million Istanbul voters returned to the polls—this time delivering a resounding victory for İmamoğlu. The margin between the two candidates soared from 13,000 to 806,000 votes, with İmamoğlu securing 54.21% of the vote. It was a painful blow to the AKP and a defining moment in Türkiye’s electoral history.
İmamoğlu further consolidated his political standing in the 2024 local elections, securing a second term as mayor of Istanbul with 51.21% of the vote, while his AKP opponent received 39.59%. Notably, his party’s approval rating stood at under 25%, suggesting that he had drawn support from other opposition parties and independent voters.
This remarkable political rise has led many to view him as Erdoğan’s strongest opponent and the one best positioned to defeat him in a potential presidential race. However, the prominence he has gained has also fuelled growing internal rivalries within his own party, the CHP—not to mention the increasing pressure from the ruling AKP and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Legal challenges were not long in coming. In December 2022, he was sentenced to two years, seven months and fifteen days in prison and received a political ban on charges of “insulting public officials.” However, he appealed the verdict, which allowed him to remain in office.
In March 2025, İmamoğlu was arrested on charges of corruption and supporting a terrorist organisation, leading to the suspension of his mayoral duties. The Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal investigation against him. He faces accusations of running a criminal organisation, extortion, bribery, fraud, unlawfully collecting personal data, and manipulating public procurement procedures. İmamoğlu is being held in Silivri Prison, where he awaits formal indictment and the start of legal proceedings—a process that is likely to take time. Among the most high-profile detainees in Silivri are Osman Kavala, the businessman accused of organising the 2013 Gezi Park protests; Selahattin Demirtaş, former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish HDP, predecessor of the current Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM); and Ümit Özdağ, leader of the nationalist Victory Party (Zafer). İmamoğlu has now joined their ranks as one of Türkiye’s most prominent political prisoners.
Under the Turkish legal system, the next step will be the filing of a formal indictment, after which İmamoğlu and the other detainees will stand trial. However, no timeline has been set. One of the main criticisms directed at the judiciary in Türkiye is that the period between the preparation of an indictment and a court hearing is often very long, meaning that detainees remain in prison for months or even years before their case is heard. For example, Ümit Özdağ has been in pre-trial detention since January 2025, still awaiting indictment.
Although his political future remains uncertain, many believe that removing him entirely from public life will prove difficult. His legal team has announced its intention to appeal the judicial investigation, as well as the earlier decision by Istanbul University to revoke his university diploma.
Did Erdoğan make a mistake by arresting İmamoğlu?
While some continue to insist that the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu is linked to the upcoming presidential elections—given that he is one of President Erdoğan’s most vocal critics and strongest challengers—a broader perspective paints a different picture. İmamoğlu has held office since 2019 and has faced seven separate investigations, yet was never detained until now. This raises a legitimate question: Why did the arrest happen at this particular time? One possible answer is that credible evidence has only recently emerged, replacing what had previously been mere speculation. In that context, framing the arrest purely as a political crackdown may no longer be a tenable position. This reasoning has failed to convince the opposition CHP, especially given that the arrest came just as the party announced its congress for 23 March 2025, where İmamoğlu was the sole candidate in the presidential race. The timing created the impression that the move was driven more by political motives than by judicial ones, sparking protests—particularly among students. The situation appears to be a complex entanglement of politics, judicial action, and internal power struggles within the CHP. Taken together, these factors have placed particular emphasis on the timing of the arrest.
One could argue that this is not merely about a single man opposing Erdoğan—the stakes are far greater. The revocation of İmamoğlu’s university degree alone would have been sufficient to disqualify him, as Article 101 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that presidential candidates must hold a university diploma. Therefore, it may not have been necessary for him to face additional corruption charges from behind bars—at least not at this particular moment.
What is particularly notable is that some reports suggest this crisis was triggered by complaints filed by members of İmamoğlu’s own party, the CHP—indicating that its roots may lie in internal rivalries. İmamoğlu and his faction ousted former party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in November 2023, and shortly afterwards, a video surfaced showing large amounts of money packed into oversized bags, raising suspicions of financial corruption within the CHP.
Many experts believe that the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu may boost his popularity, drawing comparisons with President Erdoğan’s own political trajectory. In 1999, Erdoğan was arrested while serving as mayor of Istanbul and sentenced to four months in prison on charges of inciting religious discrimination and promoting anti-secularism. Upon his release, he emerged as a political star, went on to found the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and has governed Türkiye without interruption since 2002. Striking similarities exist between İmamoğlu and Erdoğan: both played football in their youth, both began their political careers as mayors of Istanbul, both rose to the level of presidential contender, both come from the Black Sea region, and both were raised in conservative families.
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